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SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS: STATUTORY
GUIDELINES TO CLEAR THE
ROADBLOCKS TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, approximately a quarter of a million people
died as a result of accidents involving drunk drivers.' In response to
alarming statistics, both federal and state legislatures adopted new laws
aimed at reducing the number of alcohol-impaired drivers.2 Although
evidence exists suggesting that this type of legislation has reduced im-
paired driving,3 the menace of drunk driving still continues. In addi-
1. S. REP. No. 594, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988). Additionally, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported that each year over 23,000 people die
and 560,000 become injured in alcohol-related automobile accidents. Id. Drunk driving
accidents cost the nation an estimated $26 billon per year. Id. Another Senate commit-
tee reported that over five times the number of Americans who died in the Vietnam War
die in alcohol-related crashes each year. S. REP. No. 441, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1988). Moreover, every 22 minutes an alcohol-related death occurs, with one-third of
those fatalities being innocent victims. Id. The problem is so widespread that two out
of every five Americans will be injured in an alcohol-related crash in their lifetime. Id.
2. Beginning in the early 1980s, the federal government fueled the effort against
drunk driving. Congress passed legislation effectively raising the national minimum
drinking age to 21 and provided incentive grants to states which toughened their drunk
driving laws through stiffer penalties. See 23 U.S.C. §§ 408, 410 (Supp. 1990). Receipt
of grants became contingent upon states implementing mandatory license suspension
policies as well as the establishment of a maximum allowable blood alcohol content of
0.10% to name but a few. S. REP. No. 441, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988). Exemplify-
ing the ongoing congressional campaign against drunk driving, 23 U.S.C. § 410 cur-
rently authorizes basic grants to states which implement expedited license suspension
programs for DWI offenders, fines and surcharges for repeat offenders, programs for the
prevention of operators under 21 from obtaining alcohol, and registration programs for
DWI offenders. 23 U.S.C. § 410 (Supp. 1990).
3. Researchers at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety report that an esti-
mated 1600 drivers avoided fatal crashes in 1985 because of new state laws aimed at
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tion to stiffer penalties for repeat offenders, lawmakers have
increasingly focused on preventative measures. 4 One of the most con-
troversial' measures aimed at deterring drunk driving is the use of so-
briety checkpoints or driving while intoxicated roadblocks. ("D.W.I.
roadblocks").6
Law enforcement officials implement sobriety checkpoints pursuant
to varying procedural criteria.' The typical operation, however, entails
officials briefly stopping each vehicle and requesting the motorist's li-
cense and vehicle registration papers. If the officer conducting the
check believes the driver to be intoxicated,' then he requests that the
driver pull out of the line of traffic and perform a roadside sobriety
test.9
impaired driving. Highway Safety Issues, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface
Transportation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, House of Representa-
tives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 360 (1988) (statement of Brian O'Neill, President, Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety). The Institute concluded that another 2600 drivers prob-
ably would not have been involved in fatal crashes if all states had adopted tougher
laws. Id. Furthermore, the Institute found that license suspension immediately after
failure of or refusal to take a breath test was the most effective of the newly enacted
state laws. Id. at 360-61. Reportedly, mandatory license suspension laws reduced
driver involvement in fatal crashes by nine percent during the night and early morning
hours. Id. at 361.
4. Congress has pushed for stiffer penalties via contingencies on supplemental
grants to states. See 23 U.S.C. § 408(e)(3) (Supp. 1990).
5. One author points out that the same controversy does not exist with respect to
other types of "safety" checks. Micky Sadoff, National President of Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, observes that "[tioday every U.S. airport operates baggage and passen-
ger checkpoints to preserve the safe passage of all travelers with minimum intrusion."
Sadoff, Sobriety Checkpoints Save Lives, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Feb. 27, 1990, at 3B,
col. 2. She notes that few people object to airport checkpoints because such measures
assure safety. Id. at col.3. Similarly, sobriety checkpoints provide a valuable service in
educating the public as to the dangers of drinking and driving, while capturing offenders
and deterring irresponsible behavior. Id. at col. 3-4.
6. The terms "sobriety checkpoints" and "driving while intoxicated" roadblocks
will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
7. Although each state or municipality employs its own methods for conducting
roadblocks, most jurisdictions share in common certain basic criteria. See infra notes
98-112 and accompanying text for requirements for conducting roadblocks; see also
infra notes 179-81 for minimum statutory guidelines.
8. See People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984). In
order to detect intoxicated drivers, officers look for the following signs: Bloodshot eyes,
clumsy movement, and the smell of alcohol. Id. at 523, 473 N.E.2d at 2, 483 N.Y.S.2d
at 650.
9. Roadside sobriety tests include the use of heel-to-toe tests, nose-to-finger tests,
and recitation of the alphabet. Id. See also Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the
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The widespread use"° of sobriety checkpoints raises a host of fourth
amendment issues. 1  Of particular concern is whether detaining a mo-
torist without probable cause or reasonable suspicion constitutes an un-
constitutional search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
12
Part I of this Note surveys the major United States Supreme Court
cases addressing the constitutionality of roadblocks in the context of
administrative and immigration checkpoints, and closes with a discus-
sion of the Court's only decision concerning sobriety checkpoints.13
Part II of this Note examines selected state court decisions14 and state
Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457,
1463 (1983) (the police may also require a driver to take a breathalyzer test).
10. State courts disagree over the purpose of roadblocks. Some states see the pur-
pose as a technique to apprehend drunk drivers. See, eg., State ex rel. Ekstrom v.
Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1984). Other courts view sobriety checkpoints as a deterrent to drunk driv-
ing. In People v. Scott, the court noted that:
[T]he Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
trator's Office of Alcohol Countermeasures emphasizes the importance of inform-
ing the public about DWI checkpoint operations as the chief means of deterring
driving while intoxicated. We conclude that deterrence by fear of apprehension is a
constitutionally proper means of keeping drunk drivers off the highways ....
Scott, 63 N.Y.2d. at 526-27, 473 N.E.2d at 4-5, 483 N.Y.S.2d 652-53 (citations omit-
ted). See also State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48-49, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076-77
(1984) (the court concluded that checkpoints are superior to roving patrols in their
deterrent effect); People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
11. For additional discussion on this subject, see Bruce, Drunk Drivers, Roadblocks
and the Fourth Amendment, 57 UMKC L. REv. 29 (1988); Jacobs & Strossen, Mass
Investigations Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of
Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 595 (1985); Note, Curbing the
Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock
Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457 (1983); Note, Clearing the Roadblocks to Sobriety Check-
points, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 489 (1988).
12. US. CONST. amend IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
13. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). For a full
discussion of Sitz, see infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text. Because the Supreme
Court only recently addressed the issue of sobriety checkpoints, many state courts had
previously relied on dicta in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), to uphold the
constitutional validity of DWI roadblock stops. See infra notes 51-60 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of the dicta in Prouse.
14. Two-thirds of the states have ruled on the constitutionality of DWI roadblocks.
Although a roadblock might be constitutional under federal standards, it might yet vio-
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attempts to define a constitutional standard with which to evaluate the
propriety of a particular roadblock.15 In general, state courts have ex-
perienced great difficulty in enumerating such a standard. Because
only two state legislatures have enacted statutes outlining minimum
procedural safeguards for the operation of sobriety checkpoints,16 the
judiciary must evaluate roadblock procedures each time a particular
roadblock is challenged. 17
Part III of this Note proposes a model statute 8 which state legisla-
tures could follow in drafting legislation authorizing the implementa-
tion of sobriety checkpoints. This Note concludes in Part IV that a
carefully drafted statute, accounting for fourth amendment constraints,
would spare the judiciary the burdensome task of subjecting each chal-
lenged roadblock to a detailed constitutional analysis. Furthermore,
such a statute would provide municipalities and police departments
specific guidelines for setting up their own checkpoints.
I. ROADBLOCKS AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The fourth amendment applies to all seizures of the person, includ-
ing those involving a brief detention short of a traditional arrest.I9 The
late a particular state's constitution. See, e.g., State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d
977 (1985); Pimental v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989). The
Supreme Court recognizes that state courts retain the power to impose higher standards
on searches and seizures than those mandated by the federal constitution. Indeed, even
if a state constitution contains language closely tracking that of the federal constitution,
state supreme courts are free to impose more stringent standards because they function
as the final arbiters of state law. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). The
federal constitution establishes only a minimum level of protection. Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
15. See infra Part II of this Note at 154 for a discussion of state court decisions on
the constitutionality of roadblocks in light of the Supreme Court's immigration check-
point analyses.
16. HAw. REv. STAT. § 286-162.6 (1985 & Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
16.3A (1990). See also infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text discussing minimum
statutory requirements for establishment of DWI roadblocks.
17. Challenges to roadblocks normally occur after a motorist caught at the road-
block has been charged with a DWI violation and desires to suppress evidence at his
trial. See, e.g., Koppel, 127 N.H. at 287, 499 A.2d at 978; State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J.
Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518,
473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984).
18. The model statute draws upon the Supreme Court's analysis of administrative
and immigration checkpoints, selected state court decisions, and state statutes establish-
ing minimum requirements for roadblock operations.
19. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
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fourth amendment, however, only protects against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.' Whether a seizure is reasonable depends upon
a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to be
free from arbitrary invasions of privacy.2 1 Furthermore, the fourth
amendment permits certain limited "seizures" if an officer has reason-
able suspicion, a standard less than probable cause.22
The Supreme Court developed standards by which to review road-
block checkpoints through a series of immigration control cases. In
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,2 3 the Court addressed a random
search of an automobile twenty-five miles north of the Mexican-Ameri-
can border.24 The Court held the search invalid because Border Patrol
agents had neither probable cause nor consent to search the defend-
ant's vehicle for illegal drugs.25 The Court held that law enforcement
agents must have probable cause prior to detaining and searching a
vehicle to protect its occupants' right of "free passage without
interruption".26
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 12 for the text of the fourth
amendment.
21. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). The Court in Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), stated that the essential purpose of the fourth
amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by
public officials. Id. (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 528). The Prouse Court concluded that
a particular law enforcement practice should be judged by balancing its intrusion upon
the individual's fourth amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate govern-
ment interests. Id.
22. The Court in Brignoni-Ponce read Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) to establish
the proposition that the fourth amendment allows seizures on facts which do not consti-
tute probable cause to arrest. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880-81. Terry involved a
police pat down of an individual reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous. The
Terry Court upheld the seizure even though the officer neither had probable cause for
an arrest, nor knew for certain that the individual was armed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
The Terry Court concluded that a brief stop of a suspicious individual may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. Id.
23. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Almeida-Sanchez Court faced a Mexican citizen's
challenge to a conviction for possession of marijuana obtained through a warrantless
search. Id. at 267-68. The Court distinguished the roving search in this instance from
the types of searches conducted at the border. Id. at 272-73. The Court suggested that a
permanent vehicular checkpoint at the confluence of two or more roads extending from
the border might be the functional equivalent of a border search, and thus, permissible.
Id.
24. Id. at 268.
25. Id. at 273-75.
26. Id. at 270, 274-75 (citing Canara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)).
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Two years later, in United States v. Ortiz,27 the Court extended the
Almeida-Sanchez standard to searches conducted at fixed immigration
checkpoints away from the border.28 The Ortiz Court required prob-
able cause29 to search vehicles at fixed checkpoints notwithstanding the
Government's claim that such operations were less intrusive than rov-
ing stops." Although the Court recognized that fixed checkpoints
minimize official discretion to an extent, the permanent nature of such
checkpoints did not justify the substantial intrusion on the privacy of
motorists.
3 1
On the same day that Ortiz was decided, the Supreme Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of random immigration searches near in-
ternational borders in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.32 The Brignoni-
Ponce Court held that roving border patrols could stop and detain ve-
hicles only upon "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that the vehi-
cle contained illegal aliens. 33 The Court applied a balancing test which
weighed the public interest34 in preventing illegal aliens entry into the
country against interference with the right to privacy.35 In view of the
vital governmental interest and the minimal intrusion upon the car's
27. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
28. Id. at 896-97. The Court noted, however, that "different considerations might
apply to routine safety inspections required as a condition of road use. Id. at 897 n.3.
29. Id. at 896-97. The Court stated that a number of factors may be taken into
account when deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Id. at
897. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975). Officers
may consider the characteristics of the area, the proximity to the border, and previous
experience with alien traffic. Id.
30. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 894. First, the Government claimed that a checkpoint of-
ficer's discretion is limited by the location of the checkpoint. Id. Second, checkpoints
result in less of an intrusion than patrol stops. Id. Finally, motorists at checkpoints can
see that other vehicles are being stopped and hence are much less likely to be frightened.
Id.
31. Id. at 896. Speaking for the majority, Justice Powell noted that even automobile
searches result in substantial invasions of privacy. Id. To protect an individual's pri-
vacy from official arbitrariness, the Court referred to its consistent "minimum" require-
ment of probable cause before a lawful search may proceed. Id.
32. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
33. Id. at 881, 884.
34. Id. at 884. The Court accepted the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
estimate that as many as 10 to 12 million aliens illegally reside in the United States. Id.
at 878. The Court also noted that "[t]he Government makes a convincing demonstra-
tion that the public interest demands effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of
aliens at the Mexican border." Id.
35. Id.
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occupants,3 6 the Court concluded that an officer with reasonable suspi-
cion may validly stop a vehicle.37 The Court explained that although
an officer might question a driver about his citizenship and status, any
further detention should be based upon probable cause.3"
A year later, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,39 the Court enter-
tained yet another challenge to an investigatory stop at a permanent
immigration checkpoint.' Immigration officials established the road-
block on a major highway near the Mexican-American border and
gave motorists advance notice of the checkpoint stop.41 The Court
held that routine vehicular stops at permanent roadblocks could be
made in the absence of individualized suspicion if conducted at reason-
ably42  located checkpoints." Requiring' individualized suspicion
before stopping a vehicle was impractical' because heavy traffic does
not permit particularized study of vehicles to detect the presence of
36. Id. at 880. The Court downplayed the intrusion, stating that the typical stop by
a roving patrol lasts a minute at most. Id. It accepted the Government's assertion that
officers administering roving patrols merely ask a question or two and request evidence
of United States citizenship. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 25, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 473 (1975) (No. 74-114).
37. Id. at 881. An officer who reasonably suspects that a vehicle contains illegal
aliens may "stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspi-
cion." Id.
38. Id. at 882. The Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) defined
probable cause as follows: "[I]f the facts and circumstances before the officer are such
as to warrant a reasonable man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has
been committed, it is sufficient," d. at 161 (citing Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 339 (1813)).
39. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
40, Note that the Court in Ortiz ruled on the constitutionality of searches at such
checkpoints rather than the initial stop at issue in Martinez-Fuerte.
41. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545-46. The Court explained that the Border Pa-
trol conducts three kinds of inland checking operations to apprehend aliens: permanent
checkpoints, temporary checkpoints, and roving type patrols to supplement the check-
point system. Id. at 557.
42. The Court in Martinez-Fuerte found the roadblock reasonable and believed that
it met criteria established by the Border Patrol to ensure safety and effectiveness. Id. at
553, 559. Included in the criteria was a requirement that the checkpoint be located on a
stretch of highway compatible with safe operation and distant enough from the border
to avoid interference with traffic in populated areas. Id. at 553. Reviewing the evi-
dence, the Court agreed with the Government's position that this location furthered law
enforcement. Id. at 562 n. 15. The Court further reasoned that the checkpoint's perma-
nence diminished the risk that motorists would be frightened and annoyed. Id. at 558-
59.
43. Id. at 562.
44. The Court recognized that a reasonable suspicion requirement would under-
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illegal aliens.4 ' The Martinez-Fuerte Court distinguished Brignoni-
Ponce, stating that routine checkpoints involve less discretion than rov-
ing patrols because officers in the former situation stop only those vehi-
cles which pass through the checkpoint.46 The Court emphasized the
minimal intrusion involved in a checkpoint detention, noting that offi-
cials only detained motorists for approximately five minutes.47 After
balancing the public interest48 in apprehending illegal aliens against the
inconvenience to the motorist,49 the Court found that the public inter-
est outweighed the minor intrusion and upheld the stops as reasonable
fourth amendment seizures.5
In upholding the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court made
note of the wide-spread use of checkpoints to enforce laws regarding
licenses and safety requirements.51  The Court, however, did not re-
view the constitutionality of such practices until 1979 in Delaware v.
Prouse. 2 The Court in Prouse examined the use of roadblocks in the
context of random license and vehicle registration checks. 53 Although
mine a central purpose of the roadblock, namely deterring would-be smugglers known
to use the highways near the border. Id. at 557.
45. Id. at 562.
46. Id. at 559. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the location of a fixed check-
point was not chosen by officers in the field, but by officers responsible for making over-
all decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited resources. Id.
47. Id. at 560.
48. The Court recognized the necessity of traffic-checking programs in the interior
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be effectively controlled at the border. Id. at
556. Placing the checkpoints on important highways blocked a quick and safe route for
illegal aliens into the interior of the United States. Id. at 557.
49. The motorists need only respond to brief questions and produce upon request
documents evidencing the right to be in the country. Id. at 558 (citing United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975)). The Court distinguished between objective
and subjective intrusions taking place at a checkpoint stop; the objective intrusion con-
sisting of "the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection, [which] also existed
in roving patrol stops." Id. Regarding the subjective intrusion, however, checkpoint
stops fared appreciably better than roving stops. The Court enumerated various factors
demonstrating the heightened subjective intrusion unique to roving patrols, including
night operation on seldom travelled roads and lack of warning signs. Id. (citing
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 894-95).
50. Id. at 562.
51. The Court expressly disclaimed stating an opinion on roadblocks in the context
of administrative checks because the issue was not before the Court. Id. at 561 n.14.
The Court simply noted their widespread use and acceptance. Id.
52. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
53. In Prouse, a patrolman randomly stopped an automobile without any articul-
able reason. The officer then seized a quantity of marijuana in plain view on the car
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the Court recognized that states have an important interest in the pro-
motion of highway safety, it reasoned that apprehension of observed
violators is a more effective and less intrusive means to accomplish the
states' goals.54 The Court found discretionary checks overly intrusive
measures in relation to the public risk the checks were designed to
eliminate." Consequently, the Court held that the fourth amendment
requires reasonable suspicion of an unlicensed motorist56 or of some
other violation of a traffic law before an officer may detain a driver.
The Prouse Court, however, did not foreclose the availability of spot
checks involving less discretion57 on the part of officers conducting the
roadblock.58 In dictum, the Court suggested an alternative59 of ques-
tioning drivers of all oncoming vehicles at roadblock type stops.
60
floor. Id. at 650. The officer acted pursuant to no guidelines or standards in stopping
the vehicle. In fact, the officer testified, "I saw the car in the area and wasn't answering
any complaints, so I decided to pull them off." Id. at 650-51 (quoting Appellate
record).
54. Id. at 658. The Court agreed the states have a vital interest in ensuring that
only those individuals qualified to operate motor vehicles do so. Id. It also recognized
an important interest existed in enforcing vehicular inspection, regulation and licensing
laws. Id. The Court, however, did not believe the ends of highway safety justified an
intrusion upon the motorists' fourth amendment rights. Id. at 659. Furthermore, the
Court found alternate means available to reach the state's goal. Id. at 660.
55. The Court compared the random administrative stops at issue in Prouse with
the roving border patrols it held invalid in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 882-83 (1975). The Court found both types of stops physically and psychologically
intrusive stating:
Both of these types of stops generally entail law enforcement officers signaling a
moving automobile to pull over to the side of the roadway, by means of a possibly
unsettling show of authority. Both interfere with freedom of movement, are incon-
venient and consume time. Both may cause substantial anxiety.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
56. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Court believed that police were more likely to find
an unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic violations than by choosing ran-
domly from the entire universe of drivers. Id.
57. The Court carefully -pointed out that "[t]his kind of standardless and uncon-
strained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has
insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumstantial." Id. at 661.
58. Id. at 663. The Court reiterated that an individual does not completely shed his
expectation of privacy because he enters an automobile and because its use is subject to
governmental regulation. Id. at 662 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978)).
59. Id. at 663. The Court did not preclude the states from developing spot checks
which involve a slighter intrusion or which involve less than the unconstrained exercise
of discretion. Id.
60. Id.
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Shortly after Prouse, the Supreme Court clarified the fourth amend-
ment balancing test, particularly with respect to the public interest
prong.61 In Brown v. Texas,62 the Court articulated three factors to
consider when determining the reasonableness of a seizure: (1) the
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure; (2) the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest ("effectiveness"); and (3)
the severity of the intrusion.63 In Brown, the Court held that officers
could not constitutionally apprehend an individual who merely
"looked suspicious. ' The Court significantly found no evidence that
the arresting officers had acted pursuant to any neutral plan or crite-
ria.65 Presumably, the Court's balancing test would uphold a law en-
forcement practice protecting a vital public interest 66 where the
challenged practice better advances the state's objective than tradi-
tional means,' severe intrusions notwithstanding.
Through Brown and the immigration cases, the Supreme Court fash-
61. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for discussion of the fourth
amendment balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a seizure.
62. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Brown involved two police officers who observed the de-
fendant walking in an area known to have a high incidence of drug traffic. Id. at 48.
The police had no reason to suspect the defendant of any misconduct but asked him to
identify himself. When the defendant refused, the officers detained him and arrested
him. Id. at 49.
63. Id. at 51. The Court commented that a central concern in balancing competing
interests is to assure that "an individual's reasonable expectation is not subject to arbi-
trary invasions of privacy solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Id.
The Court concluded that "[t]o this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure
must be... carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers." Id. (citing Deleware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663
(1979)).
64. Id. at 52.
65. Id.
66. Reviewing this prong of the balancing test in the context of DWI roadblocks, a
strong public interest indisputably exists in combatting drunk driving. See, e.g., South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) (stating, "[t]he carnage caused by drunk
drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here"); People v. Bartley,
109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985) (claiming it is beyond dispute that drunk drivers
are a grave menace to the public and that stronger measures are needed to cope with the
problem); State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 496 A.2d 442 (1985) (noting the serious threat
posed to public safety by intoxicated drivers operating motor vehicles); see also supra
notes 1-4 and accompanying text for discussion of yearly statistics on drunk driving.
67. Authorities dispute the efficacy of roadblocks. Of course, the measure of effec-
tiveness relates to the public goal, viz. apprehension versus deterrence. For the effective-
ness of roadblocks in detecting drunk drivers as compared to more traditional means,
see infra note 141.
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ioned a framework by which to analyze the constitutionality of DWI
roadblocks.68 Furthermore, dicta in Prouse seemed to support the pro-
priety of DWI roadblocks, despite the Court's reluctance to set specific
guidelines for the use of roadblocks outside of the immigration
context.69
Without defining the constitutional parameters of sobriety check-
points, the Court recently held that such checkpoints will withstand
fourth amendment scrutiny so long as all motorists are stopped and are
only briefly detained.7' In Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz,7 1 a divided Court held that the initial stop and questioning of all
motorists for signs of intoxication is constitutionally permissible under
the fourth amendment.72 Relying on the Brown balancing test,7 3 the
Court stated that the state's interest in preventing drunk driving out-
weighed what the Court deemed to be a slight intrusion upon the mo-
torist.74 The Court in Sitz found the type of sobriety checkpoint at
issue as indistinguishable from the immigration checkpoint upheld in
68. For general discussion of how state courts apply the immigration cases to the
DWI context, see Rogers, The Drunk Driving Roadblock- Random Seizure or Minimal
Intrusion? 21 CRIM L. BULL. 197 (1985); Comment, The Constitutionality of Drunk
Driving Roadblocks, 58 U. COLo. L. Rav. 109 (1987).
69. See supra note 59 and accompanying text for discussion of the Prouse dicta. At
least one author contends that the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Prouse
amounted to more than "mere" dicta. Referring to Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1983), the author writes, "The Court indicated that the language in Prouse was more
than mere dicta and appears to leave little doubt that roadblocks are valid. See Bruce,
supra note 11, at 32.
70. Stated otherwise, the Court gave but one example of how a state may implement
a checkpoint program. See infra note 71 describing the particular procedure.
71. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). The roadblock at issue in Sitz stopped every vehicle
passing through a fixed checkpoint on a highway. Id. at 2484. Police officers examined
each motorist for signs of intoxication. Id. If an individual appeared to be intoxicated,
then the officer directed the motorist out of the line of traffic and checked his driver's
license and registration papers. If warranted, the officer thereafter directed the individ-
ual to perform a series of field sobriety tests. Id.
72. Id. at 2488. The Court in Sitz decided only the constitutionality of the initial
stop and questioning, and not the additional detention and administration of field sobri-
ety tests. Id. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of what
degree of suspicion might be needed for further detention of an individual.
73. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Brown
balancing test.
74. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2484. The Court noted that the average delay of each vehicle
at the checkpoint stop was only 25 seconds. Id. The Court felt that the lower court
misread previous decisions discussing the question of "subjective intrusion" upon the
motorist. Id. at 2486. The Court noted that the "fear and surprise" relevant to the
question does not include the fear of an individual who has been drinking. Id. Rather,
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the Martinez-Fuerte case.7"
Furthermore, the Sitz Court stated that the "effectiveness" prong of
the Brown balancing test was not meant to be an empirical standard
requiring scientific quantification. Rather a particular law enforcement
method would better combat a particular problem, as compared to its
alternatives.76 For fourth amendment purposes, the choice of a partic-
ular method need only be a choice among reasonable alternatives, to be
made by the governmental officials who are better situtated to allocate
scarce public resources.77
In a strongly worded dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens disagreed with the majority that the intrusion upon motorists
stopped at the checkpoint was slight.78 In sharp contrast to the major-
ity approach, the dissent focussed on the "effectiveness" prong of the
Brown balancing test.79 The dissent did not believe that a one percent
arrest rate 0 could be viewed as an effective means of apprehending
drunk drivers.81 Consequently, the dissent concluded that the road-
block procedures failed the Brown balancing test.82 Furthermore, the
dissent stated that the real goal of the roadblock was to deter drunk
driving and that law enforcement officials did not even attempt to jus-
tify the roadblock on the basis of the number of arrests made. 3
subjective fear embodies that of the law-abiding citizen who is stopped at a checkpoint.
Id.
75. Id. at 2487.
76. Id. The Court stated that Brown's language discussing the effectiveness factor
"was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the deci-
sion as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be
employed to deal with a serious public danger." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent focused in particular on the
fact that the checkpoints were normally operated at night. The lack of guidelines uti-
lized by the officers in their decision to detain particular motorists similarly troubled the
dissent. Id. at 2492-93. Justice Stevens stated that a Michigan officer who detains a
motorist at a checkpoint can do so on the basis of the "slightest suspicion." Id. at 2493.
79. Id. at 2492. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Brown balancing test.
80. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2495 n. 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the
Michigan police conceded that the arrest rate at the checkpoint was "very low." On
this basis, the dissent believed that the roadblock failed the "effectiveness" prong of the
fourth amendment balancing test. Id. at 2492.
81. Id. at 2495.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2495-96. Justice Stevens characterized sobriety checkpoints as "elabo-
rate, and disquieting, publicity stunts." Id. at 2498.
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Interestingly, the Sitz Court expressly declined to resolve how much
evidence would be needed in order for officials to pull a motorist out of
the line of traffic and question him further." Although probable cause
would not appear to be required in order to further question a motorist
after an initial stop, the Court intimated that some amount of "individ-
ualized suspicion" would probably be necessary.85
Although the Court in Sitz stated that a Michigan state police com-
mittee sat for the purpose of drafting guidelines to implement the
checkpoint program, the opinion surprisingly failed to mention what, if
any, specific guidelines had been adopted.86 Presumably, after Sitz,
roadblocks operated pursuant to specific guidelines would be upheld to
the extent that the questioning is brief and the intrusion is minimal.
However, because the Court was silent as to what procedures are actu-
ally necessary for a roadblock program to survive constitutional scru-
tiny, state courts are left with little guidance in evaluating their own
roadblock programs.
An examination of state court decisions evaluating roadblock proce-
dures will show the types of safeguards courts require in determining
the validity of a particular roadblock. Similarly, examining the vari-
ous procedures and the judicial responses thereto will help define the
limits of permissible intrusion which a particular roadblock may have
on an individual motorist."8
A cautionary note should be registered with respect to various state
court decisions. Although state courts are obligated to follow the Sitz
decision as a matter of federal constitutional law, state courts may still
find a sobriety checkpoint invalid as a matter of state constitutional
84. Id. at 2485. The Court noted that the action before it challenged only the use of
sobriety checkpoints generally. Id.
85. Id.
86. The Court in Sitz mentioned how the Michigan police operated the roadblock in
broad terms with little discussion of the specific procedures utilized in conducting the
checkpoint. Id. at 2495. In contrast, moat state court decisions elaborate in great detail
the procedures used in conducting checkpoints to minimize the intrusion upon the
motorist.
87. See generally Part II of this Note for a survey of state court decisions discussing
procedures utilized in conducting sobriety checkpoints.
88. Because two-thirds of the states addressed the constitutionality of roadblocks
prior to the Sitz decision, it is necessary to examine the factors states consider when
evaluating checkpoint validity. Furthermore, state considerations are important be-
cause the states are always free to invalidate a roadblock on state constitutional
grounds.
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II. STATE COURTS AND DWI ROADBLOCKS
A. Judicial Responses to Roadblock Constitutionality
Prior to the Sitz decision, over two-thirds of the states had already
addressed the constitutionality of DWI roadblocks in the context of
both federal and state court challenges.9 0 Of the thirty-one states
which have examined the issue, twenty-two91 will uphold some type of
roadblock if it meets certain minimum requirements.9 2 States ruling
roadblocks to be unconstitutional93 often find subsequent examples
89. See supra note 14.
90. In addition to the 31 states that ruled directly on the constitutionality of DWI
roadblocks, others indicated that they would also uphold such practices. See, e.g.,
Cains v. State, 555 So. 2d 290 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Aguinaldo, 71 Haw. 51,
782 P.2d 1225 (1989). In both cases the defendant did not challenge the initial stop of
the vehicle, but nevertheless, the court proceeded with a lengthy discussion of why
roadblocks are constitutionally permissible if conducted properly.
91. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987);
People v. Rister, No. 89SC212 (Colo. Dec. 7, 1990) (Westlaw, Genstate library); State
v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (Ct. App. 1984); People v Bartley, 109 Ill.
2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986); State v. Garcia, 489
N.E.2d 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Riley, 377 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985);
State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660
S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984); State v. Church,
530 So.2d 1235 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 530 So. 2d 993 (1989); State v. Cloukey, 486
A.2d 143 (Me. 1985); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); Miller v. State,
373 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 1979); State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988);
State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); City
of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (1987); People v. Scott, 63
N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984); State v. Goines, 16 Ohio App.3d
168, 474 N.E.2d 1219 (1984); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1979); State v.
Record, 548 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1988); Crandol v. City of Newport News, 238 Va. 697, 386
S.E.2d 113 (1988); State v. Marchand, 37 Wash. App. 741, 684 P.2d 1306 (Ct. App.
1984), rev'd, 104 Wash. App. 434, 706 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Frisby, 161 W.
Va. 734, 245 S.E.2d 622 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1979).
92. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text for discussion of minimum road-
block requirements.
93. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983);
Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGe-
oghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d 599
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 461 (1986); State v.
Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1984); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987); Commonwealth
v. Slovikosky, 374 Pa. Super. 441, 543 A.2d 553 (Super Ct. 1988); Pimental v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989); State v. Higbie, 780 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989).
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permissible where the police modify their practices.94 A small number
of states find roadblocks per se unconstitutional.95 These states hold
roadblocks unconstitutional under state constitutions even where the
language in the state constitution copies verbatim that of the fourth
amendment.9 6 Some states which permit the use of roadblocks have
later held them to be unconstitutional because of inadequate proce-
dural safeguards.97
One of the first state courts to address the use of roadblocks in the
wake of Prouse was the New Jersey Superior Court in State v. Coc-
como.9" In Coccomo, the police maintained a roadblock designed to
stop every fifth vehicle during light traffic hours.99 The court first de-
termined that a vital state interest existed in detecting and prosecuting
drunk drivers."o The court then examined the reasonableness of the
roadblock by subjecting its mechanics to a detailed analysis.1 01 In par-
94. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984); State v.
Abelson, 485 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Church, 530 So. 2d 1235
(La. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 580 So. 2d 993 (1989).
In contrast, several states which found roadblocks permissible initially later found
them impermissible because of the way the police conducted subsequent efforts. See,
e.g., State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)
(invalidating roadblock because decision to establish it was made by a field officer and
not a supervisor); Simmons v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 656 (Va. 1989) (invalidating
roadblock because state offered no evidence of procedural safeguards or advance plan of
operation).
95. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Boijanovsky, 304
Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (1987); Piment l v. Department of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I.
1989); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 775 P.2d 775 (1988).
96. In Pimental, the court stated that greater protection may be given to citizens
under state constitutions, notwithstanding similar language in both constitutions. Pi-
mental, 561 A.2d at 1350 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)). The
court noted, however, that the decision to depart from the minimum standards of the
federal constitution and increase protection under the state constitution would be taken
"guardedly and ... [when] supported by a principled rationale." Id. at 1350-51 (quot-
ing Duquette v. Godbolt, 471 A.2d 1359, 1361 (R.I. 1984), quoting State v. Benoit, 417
A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980)).
97. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text for discussion of minimum road-
block requirements.
98. 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
99. Id. at 579, 427 A.2d at 133. The Roxbury Police Department adopted this
procedure upon recommendation of the Morris County Prosecutor who modeled the
procedure after suggestions in the Prouse dicta.
100. Id. at 582, 427 A.2d at 134. The court stated that drunk drivers are a threat to
themselves and to other motorists. It further emphasized the need to identify and re-
move drunk drivers from the road. Id. at 582, 427 A.2d at 135.
101. The Coccomo court's painstaking analysis provided the starting point for other
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ticular, the court emphasized the use of various procedural safeguards
such as flares, marked police cars, and uniformed officers. 0 2 The court
further found that the police operated the roadblock pursuant to com-
pletely neutral and objective criteria. ' °3 Consequently, the court deter-
mined the roadblock to be valid.1°
Building upon the foundation laid by the Coccomo court, the Kansas
Supreme Court, in State v. Deskins,1°5 enunciated thirteen factors to be
considered in determining whether a particular roadblock passes mus-
ter under Brown. 06 The court suggested the following factors:
1. degree of discretion left to the officer in the field;
2. location designated for the roadblock;
3. time and duration of the roadblock;
4. standards set by superior officers;
5. advance public notice;
6. advance warning to individual motorists as they approach the
roadblock;
7. maintenance of safety conditions;
8. degree of fear or anxiety generated by the method of
operation;
9. average length of time each motorist is detained;
10. physical factors surrounding the location, type, and method;
11. availability of less intrusive methods for combatting the
problem;
12. degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and
13. any other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the
test. 107
The Deskins court emphasized that not all of the enunciated factors
need to support upholding a roadblock; rather, courts should consider
state courts in their own analyses of various roadblocks. See Bruce, supra note 11, at
37.
102. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. at 583, 427 A.2d at 135.
103. Id. The court stated the actual manner of stopping the vehicle was designed to
promote safety and to reduce motorist anxiety. Id.
104. Id. at 582, 427 A.2d at 134. The court concluded that the procedure used was
consistent with the Prouse dicta.
105. 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983).
106. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Brown
balancing test.
107. Deskins, 234 Kan. at 541, 673 P.2d at 1185.
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each listed factor before passing on the constitutional issue.10 8 Citing
neutral criteria, minimized discretion of field officers, a well-lit loca-
tion, and the presence of uniformed officers, the court in Deskins con-
cluded the intrusion to be minimal and upheld the roadblock.109
Numerous other courts11 o have relied on at least some of the Deskins
factors when analyzing the constitutionality of particular roadblocks.
Depending on which combination of factors a court adopts, a road-
block may or may not be sustained.' This approach leads to uncer-
tainties within a state as well as inconsistencies among the states.'
12
Apart from the fairly exhaustive list of Deskins factors, courts rely
on the purposes of the roadblocks in evaluating their constitutionality.
Depending on whether a state adopts the goal of deterrence or appre-
hension of drunk drivers, a different outcome may result.1 13
Recently, a Texas court focused extensively on the purpose of a
DWI roadblock in Higbie v. State. 114 Rejecting the state's asserted
motive, the Higbie court concluded that the police installed a road-
block to detect and apprehend drunk drivers rather than to check driv-
ers' licenses." 5 It also noted that if an intoxicated motorist is stopped
108. Id.
109. Id. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 1186.
110. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr.
42 (1987); State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988); Little v. State 300 Md. 485, 479
A.2d 903 (1984).
111. For instance, states differ on their approaches to advance notice, a Deskins
criteria. Compare Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349,
350 (1983) (stressing the lack of public notice with respect to the roadblock it invali-
dated) with State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986) (advance notice not necessary if
police officers conducting roadblock gave adequate notice to approaching motorists).
Similarly, differences exist regarding the requisite nature of the location. Compare State
v. Parms 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988) (requiring evidence that site chosen for roadblock
be based on studies indicating a high incidence of DWI arrests) with Crandol v. City of
Newport News, 238 Va. 697, 386 S.E.2d 113 (1989) (upholding roadblock despite ab-
sence of evidence indicating a "fertile ground" for drunk drivers).
112. See supra notes 94 & 97 for states which have reached opposite outcomes re-
garding separate roadblocks.
113. Courts generally agree that roadblocks effectively serve the deterrence objec-
tive. However, it is difficult to statistically show how many individuals are actually
deterred from drinking and driving. See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz.,
136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (invalidating roadblock because state offered no statis-
tical evidence showing the roadblock's effectiveness).
114. 780 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).
115. Id. at 230. The Higbie court determined the intent of the authorities in erect-
ing what the state termed a "driver's license roadblock" by examining all the facts sur-
rounding the case. Id. Because police established the roadblock less than a mile from
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at a roadblock, criminal sanctions can result.' 16 Following longstand-
ing Supreme Court precedent, the court required a standard of reason-
able suspicion before any motorist could be stopped and detained for
criminal, as opposed to administrative purposes.' 17
An earlier California court took an alternate view of the purpose
behind sobriety checkpoints in Ingersoll v. Palmer."II The California
Supreme Court explained that roadblocks are operated not for the pur-
pose of detecting criminal offenders, but for the regulatory purpose of
keeping drunk drivers off the road. "9 The Ingersoll court analogized
DWI roadblocks to acknowledged regulatory procedures such as im-
migration and administrative checkpoints.' 20 Because the police ad-
ministered the checkpoint pursuant to predetermined and neutral
criteria, the questioning of drivers passed the threshold constitutional
barrier. 12'
In its analysis, the Ingersoll court articulated many of the same crite-
ria outlined in the Deskins case. 22 Supervisors made decisions, 123 field
officers had circumscribed discretion, the officers chose a proper loca-
certain bars, the court concluded the purpose of the roadblock was to apprehend drunk
drivers. Id.
116. Id. at 240. The court strongly emphasized the need for reasonable suspicion
when criminal conduct is at issue, concluding that the state could not subvert the pre-
sumption of innocence. Id. at 239. To hold otherwise would be to permit the state to
"tak[e] preemptive actions resulting in scenarios of the Orwellian state." Id. See also
State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 564 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (concluding that roadblock pro-
cedures draw dangerously close to what may be referred to as police-state practices).
117. Higbie, 780 S.W.2d at 240. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals,
however, declined to hold that DWI roadblocks are per se unconstitutional.
118. 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987).
119. Id. at 1335, 743 P.2d at 1309, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 52. The Ingersoll court con-
cluded that roadblock programs inevitably deter some drunk driving. Id. at 1337, 743
P.2d at 1310, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 53. Citing two test areas in Maryland, the court noted a
reduction in alcohol related accidents by 75%. Id.
120. Id. at 1331-32, 743 P.2d at 1306, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50 Id. The court also
noted the similarities between roadblock operations and airport searches: both are
aimed to prevent and deter conduct injurious to persons and property and are not con-
ventional searches and seizures. Id. See also Sadoff, supra note 5.
121. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1342, 743 P.2d at 1314, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for the Deskins criteria.
123. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1342, 743 P.2d at 131, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 57. The court
stated that decision-making at the supervisory level is essential to reduce the possibility
of arbitrary and capricious enforcement techniques. Id. For other requirements of su-
pervisory decision-making, see State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (Ct.
App. 1984); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 48 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984);
Little v. State, 479 A.2d 903 (1984).
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tion,'24 and safety mechanisms existed to minimize intrusiveness on
motorists. 2 ' For additional authority supporting its decision, the In-
gersoll court relied on what it characterized as law enforcement's im-
plicit authority to enforce criminal law generally and traffic laws
specifically.126 Noting that the legislature never specifically authorized
the use of sobriety checkpoints, the court nevertheless found statutory
authority embodied in the California Vehicle Code as a whole. 127
As a final argument the California court addressed whether some
type of tangible proof showing the success of the roadblock was neces-
sary to uphold the roadblock. 2 ' The court finessed the question as-
suming simply that if the roadblock was serving its deterrence purpose,
then little proof to substantiate actual numbers of drunk drivers would
exist.129 This reasoning eventually satisfied the court, which asserted
that the potential effectiveness of the roadblock negated the need for
concrete proof.130
Further examination of state court decisions shows outcomes based
in part on differing emphases on the various requirements and in part
on idiosyncratic fact patterns. In Simmons v. Commonwealth,' 3' the
Virginia Supreme Court examined a roadblock designed to stop all ve-
hicles.' 32 Technically, the procedure met the criteria of the 100%
roadblock advocated in roTuse. 3 3 The state argued that "no more
124. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1343, 743 P.2d at 1314, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 58. The court
required roadblocks to be located on roads having a high incidence of alcohol-related
accidents. Id.
125. Id. at 1345, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61. Suggested safeguards
included clearly visible warning lights, marked police vehicles, and the presence of uni-
formed officers. Id.
126. Id. at 1348, 743 P.2d at 1318, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
127. Id. at 1347-48, 743 P.2d at 1310, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61.
128. Id. at 1338, 743 P.2d at 1311, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
129. Id. at 1339, 743 P.2d at 1312, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 55. See also 4 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987).
130. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1339, 743 P.2d at 1312, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 55. In the
court's words, "[i]t would be presumptuous in the extreme for this court to prohibit the
use of an otherwise permissible and potentially effective procedure merely because its
effectiveness is at the present time largely untested." Id.
131. 238 Va. 200, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989).
132. Id. at 202, 280 S.E.2d at 657. Although the police established the roadblock to
inspect drivers' licenses and equipment, the court analyzed the procedures pursuant to
the same sobriety checkpoint criteria it established in Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va.
346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986).
133. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Prouse
dicta.
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neutral criteria" could have been used to conduct a roadblock opera-
tion.134 The court, however, disagreed and invalidated the roadblock
on the ground that the decision to establish the roadblock had been
made by the field officers conducting it.135 Furthermore, the police de-
partment did not determine the location and duration of the roadblock
in advance, but instead left the decision to the discretion of the field
officers conducting the checkpoint. 136
Less than five months later the Virginia Supreme Court again faced
a challenge to a roadblock operation. In Crandol v. City of Newport
News, 137 the court upheld a challenge to a roadblock because supervi-
sory personnel made the operational decisions. 138 Interestingly, the
court upheld the checkpoint even though the city conducting the road-
block presented neither evidence regarding the potential success of the
program, nor studies indicating the site chosen had a high incidence of
drunk drivers. 139 In an earlier Virginia decision,1" the court cited
both of these factors as constitutional necessities. 141
Some courts consider the availability of alternate methods of en-
forcement crucial to establishing the constitutionality of roadblocks.142
134. Simmons, 238 Va. at 203, 380 S.E.2d at 658.
135. Id. at 204, 380 S.E.2d at 659.
136. Id.
137. 238 Va. 697, 386 S.E.2d 113 (1989).
138. Id. at 699, 386 S.E.2d at 114.
139. Id. at 700-01, 386 S.E.2d at 114-155. Cf. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321,
743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987) (requiring evidentiary support for site chosen
for roadblock).
140. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985).
141. Id. at 350-52, 337 S.E.2d at 276-77.
142. See, eg., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d
992 (1983). The court in Ekstrom concluded that the roadblock in question was imper-
missible because the state offered no statistics showing the roadblock was more effective
at dealing with the problem of drunk driving than the more traditional roving patrol
acting upon reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that the state proved too much
by its stipulation:
DPS officials, by observing and patrolling, regularly arrest drivers for DWI vio-
lations when there are no roadblocks. DPS officers are trained to detect drunk
drivers on the road on the basis of observation. An experienced DPS officer be-
comes highly skilled at detecting drunk drivers by watching how a person drives.
Without roadblocks, an experienced DPS officer can detect many drunk drivers.
Id. at 5, 663 P.2d at 996. Cf. State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48-49, 691 P.2d
1073, 1077 (1984) (where the state offers statistics to show a drop in alcohol-related
injuries during the operation of the roadblock, the roadblock will be permissible). The
Arizona court further noted that the police had been unable to reduce drunk driving
casualties by the more traditional roving patrol. Id. at 49, 691 P.2d at 1077. See also
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This concern comports with the Supreme Court's rationale in uphold-
ing immigration checkpoints in the Martinez-Fuerte case 143 for the
purpose of controlling the entry of illegal aliens at the border. In Peo-
ple v. Bartley,"4 an Illinois court emphasized fundamental differences
between violations of transporting illegal aliens and violations of drunk
driving laws in its invalidation of a DWI roadblock. 145 The court
stated that less intrusive means existed to detect drunk drivers such as
observing driving behavior and enacting stiffer penalties.14 By distin-
guishing roadblock stops from immigration checkpoints, the court sug-
gested that no alternate means existed for effectively detecting the
presence of illegal aliens.147
Other state courts take a different view regarding alternate means.
In State v. Superior Court,4 ' an Arizona court upheld a roadblock be-
cause traditional methods such as roving patrols had not proved any
more effective in reducing injuries from alcohol-related accidents."'
The California Supreme Court in Ingersoll v. Palmer,"50 discussed
above, agreed with this proposition in upholding a sobriety checkpoint.
The Ingersoll court noted that roving stops require some observable
behavior indicating impairment.' 5' The court quoted an estimate that
such methods result in arrests of between one in two hundred to one in
People v. Bartley, 109 I1. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985) (concluding that trained of-
ficers are the most effective means of apprehending drunk drivers); State v. Koppel, 127
N.H. 286, 499 A.2d. 977 (1985) (court remanded because state failed to show road-
blocks produced a more sufficient public benefit compared to more traditional means).
143. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text for discussion of Martinez-
Fuerte.
144. 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985).
145. Id. at 273, 486 N.E.2d at 884.
146. Id.
147. Id. See also State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 499 A.2d 977 (1985) (invalidating
roadblock because of showing that less intrusive means were available).
148. 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984).
149. Id. at 49, 691 P.2d at 1077. The court noted that alcohol-related accidents
were reduced by three and a half percent during the time the roadblock operated. Id.
More traditional methods of roving stops did not effectuate the same results. See supra
note 142 for further discussion on the need to present evidence of less intrusive means.
150. 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987). See supra notes 118-
30 and accompanying text for further discussion of Ingersoll.
151. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1340, 743 P.2d at 1312, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 55. The court
stated that simply because a driver is intoxicated does not mean that he will drive errati-
cally in the vicinity of a patrolling officer. Id. ,
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two thousand drunk drivers." 2 Consequently, the court reasoned that
the roadblock served the deterrence rationale at least as effectively as
the roving patrol.1 53
As with alternate means, permanency of roadblocks is a significant
factor to which courts disagree. 15 4 This requirement stems from the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the permanent nature of immigration
checkpoints in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.1 5 The Martinez-Fu-
erte Court cautioned that checkpoints should have some semblance of
permanency to ensure that motorists would not be "taken by sur-
prise."' 156 In State v. Smith,157 an Oklahoma court read Martinez-Fu-
erte as imposing a strict requirement of permanency upon the
operation of roadblocks.15 8 The Smith court identified the critical dis-
tinction between DWI roadblocks and immigration roadblocks as be-
ing the regularity of the operations.159 In view of the facts at hand, the
court classified the DWI roadblock as a "temporary checkpoint"." 6
Although the court noted that the roadblocks in question stood at fixed
locations for fixed periods of time, 16 1 it concluded that they were not
the type of permanent checkpoints approved for use in the Martinez-
152. Id. (citing 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 129).
153. Id.
154. Courts which emphasize the regularity of a checkpoint do so in an attempt to
accommodate the Martinez-Fuerte emphasis on permanency. See supra notes 42 & 49
and accompanying text.
155. The Martinez-Fuerte Court stressed the need for permanency in checkpoints so
as not to take the motorist by surprise. The Court observed, "[a]t traffic checkpoints
the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the
officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intru-
sion." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (quoting United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)).
156. Id.
157. 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
158. Id. at 565. The court believed that a temporary roadblock conducted without
any articulable facts for detaining an individual constitutes an unreasonable seizure
under the fourth amendment. Id.
159. Id. The court noted that the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte were for a limited
purpose, and the community was well aware of their purpose. Id.
160. Id. The Smith court pointed out that the temporary checkpoints at issue were
intended to detect illicit behavior to which criminal penalties attach. The court noted
that the element of fear is probably much greater at a temporary checkpoint than at a
permanent one. Id.
161. Id. The court noted that although the locations were fixed, the checkpoints
were not regularly established, on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. Id.
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Fuerte case.162
Other state courts read the Martinez-Fuerte opinion differently with
respect to its observations on permanency. These courts focus instead
on the need to minimize the surprise experienced by motorists.163
Consequently, some courts mandate advance public notice of the
checkpoint operation in lieu of a permanency requirement. 1" Logi-
cally, this approach makes better sense because a permanent DWI
roadblock would serve as a very poor deterrent. Other states, however,
uphold temporary roadblocks even when the police give no advance
notice.165
Although most states carefully monitor how law enforcement offi-
cials conduct roadblocks, some states refuse to uphold roadblocks de-
spite police compliance with strict guidelines. 166 In Pimental v.
162. Id.
163. See People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985); Little v. State,
300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 473
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984). In Scott, the court noted that a roadblock's shifting and tempo-
rary nature does not affect its validity. Id. at 526, 473 N.E.2d at 5, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
The court emphasized that the fright and annoyance of a roving stop is minimized even
at a temporary checkpoint. Id. at 527, 473 N.E.2d at 5, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 653. It rea-
soned that the visible signs of authority - signs, lights, marked police vehicles -
greatly diminished the intrusion upon the motorist. Id.
164. Courts requiring advance notice include the following: State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d
1102 (1985) (stressing press release prior to roadblock); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230
Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985) (emphasizing extensive media publication).
Courts which emphasize public notification as a rule do not require announcement of
the precise location of the checkpoint, but simply require the public be told of the date
when the roadblock is to occur. Often these courts further require some type of signal
to the approaching motorist, such as a large sign indicating that the roadblock is in
operation. In addition to reducing fear and surprise for motorists, advance notice serves
the purpose of deterrence. See generally 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURE (2d
ed. 1988); Comment, Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Constitutional in Light of
Deleware v. Prouse? 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 813, 823 (1984).
165. See, e.g., People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985) (lack of
advance publicity alone insufficient basis for invalidation, where other measures taken
by the police reduced the subjective intrusion). In State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45,
691 P.2d 1073 (1984) the court observed that "[a]dvance notice of the exact location is
not an absolute necessity for DWI roadblocks... [because] publishing the exact spot of
the checkpoint would lessen the deterrent effect." Id. at 49, 691 P.2d at 1077. The
court further noted that motorists who knew of such roadblocks "would simply avoid
those locations." Id.
166. See supra note 95 for cases which hold roadblocks unconstitutional regardless
of how conducted.
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Department of Transportation,167 police established a checkpoint pro-
gram pursuant to strict guidelines for planning, procedure, and person-
nel.168 A press release announcing the program took place prior to the
actual implementation of the roadblock. 169 The court, however, held
the roadblock invalid under state law. 170
The Pimental court stated that even if the roadblock could meet fed-
eral constitutional standards, the Rhode Island Constitution afforded
more protection to its citizens. 71 The court concluded that probable
cause or at least some type of individualized suspicion is necessary to
apprehend and detain a motorist. 172 As a matter of state law, the court
explained that states can impose higher standards for searches and
seizures than those required by the federal constitution. 173
B. Statutory Authority to Establish Roadblocks
In light of the endemic uncertainty regarding rules for roadblocks,
several state legislatures 74 have adopted laws authorizing their use.
The Nevada legislature has authorized the establishment of temporary
167. 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989).
168. Id. at 1348.
169. Id. Although the press release indicated that multiple roadblocks would be
established in high-volume traffic areas around Providence, the article did not reveal the
roadblocks' precise times or locations. Id.
170. Id. at 1353. The court conceded that the roadblock at issue was conducted
pursuant to strict guidelines and with minimal intrusion to motorists. Id. at 1352-53.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that "no control or discretion can justify roadblock
seizures under Rhode Island law" in view of the total absence of probable cause that the
stopped motorist committed a motor vehicle violation. Id. at 1353.
171. Id. See supra note 96. The court found it "illogical to permit police to stop
fifty or a hundred vehicles on the speculative chance that one or two might [be driven by
drunk drivers]." Pimental, 567 A.2d at 1352. Such a stop would constitute an unrea-
sonable search and seizure under the Rhode Island Constitution. Id.
172. Pimental, 567 A.2d at 1352. The court stated that it "would shock and offend
the framers of the Rhode Island Constitution if we were to hold that the guarantees
against unreasonable and warrantless searches and seizures should be subordinated to
the interest of efficient law enforcement." Id.
173. Id.
174. Legislatures in four states adopted laws establishing minimum requirements
for the operation of administrative and temporary checkpoints. Although these statutes
do not specifically refer to DWI roadblocks, the standards established can be used in
formulating a model statute for the operation of sobriety checkpoints. See IOWA CODE
ANN. § 321K.1 (West 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.3591 (1985); S.D CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 32-33-10 (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 7-17-102 (1977).
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and administrative roadblocks.'75 The legislature also has set mini-
mum requirements for the operation of roadblocks.' 76 The minimum
requirements focus on the use of signs, flares, and proper location to
ensure adequate visibility.'77 These roadblocks, however, are designed
for administrative checks rather than for detection of criminal
activity.' 7
Only Hawaii and North Carolina179 have specifically authorized
roadblocks for the purpose of apprehending drunk drivers. Of the two,
the Hawaii statute provides a more detailed list of requirements for the
operation of roadblocks.'" 0 Many of the procedural requirements in
the statute coincide with those enumerated by state courts following
the Deskins criteria."' Legislative hearings on the Hawaii roadblock
statute indicate that the legislature believed roadblock programs con-
ducted pursuant to appropriate guidelines serve as reasonable means of
protecting the vital public interest in removing drunk drivers from the
roads. 18
2
III. MODEL STATUTE
Case law from a large majority of jurisdictions indicates that a DWI
roadblock meeting certain basic criteria will survive constitutional
175. NEv. REV. STAT. § 484.3591 (1985).
176. Id.
177. Id. The Nevada statute requires that all temporary roadblocks have sufficient
cones, reflectors, and flares in order to adequately identify the roadblock. Id. These
devices must be placed at least 200 feet away from the roadblock on both sides of the
road to ensure that advancing motorists have adequate warning of the oncoming haz-
ardous condition. Id.
178. Although statutes setting minimum standards for administrative and tempo-
rary emergency roadblocks are helpful in determining criteria for DWI roadblocks,
roadblocks designed for crime detection must contain extra safeguards. Because DWI
convictions carry criminal penalties, many courts require more stringent safeguards.
See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text discussing a case emphasizing this extra
need.
179. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 286-162.6 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A
(1983).
180. Among other criteria, the Hawaii statute mandates: (1) Standard patterns for
detaining vehicles; (2) fixed times and locations; (3) proper illumination; and (4) ad-
vance warning of the roadblocks' existence and purpose. HAw. Rav. STAT. § 286-
162.6 (1984).
181. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text discussing the Deskins case.
182. 1984 Haw. Sess. Laws 1629-84.
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scrutiny.18 Although statutory authority is not a prerequisite for es-
tablishing a valid roadblock, a statute would give needed guidance to
municipalities and police departments intending to utilize DWI road-
blocks. Furthermore, allowing the legislature 84 to establish guidelines
and procedures would free the judiciary would be free from evaluating
a roadblock once it meets the statutory requirements.
Although some advocate requiring that enforcement agents secure a
judicial warrant prior to the operation of a roadblock,185 a properly
conducted checkpoint obviates the need for this additional safeguard.
Warrant advocates contend that judicial intervention will minimize of-
ficial discretion. 86 This argument overlooks the simple logic that ap-
propriate statutory guidelines strictly curtail official discretion by
requiring roadblocks be executed at specified times, at specified places
and in a specified manner.
The top priority in drafting a "road-block" statute is to assure mini-
mal intrusion upon the motorist.1 87 Accomplishing this objective
would require short detention periods, adequate notice of what is tak-
ing place, and sufficient safety mechanisms in operation at the check-
point. 88 The second important requirement in formulating a
roadblock statute is assurance that supervisory personnel 8 9 make deci-
sions in advance with respect to the time, location, and mechanics of
183. See supra note 91 for courts upholding roadblocks. The Supreme Court to
date has established only very broad baseline criteria. See supra notes 71-85 and accom-
panying text discussing the Sitz decision.
184. Allowing the legislature to set minimum roadblock standards has several ad-
vantages. First, the legislature employs standing committees familiar with the problem
of drunk driving. The expertise these specialized groups could bring to bear on the issue
would aid the process as a whole. Furthermore, the legislature represents the majority
of citizens. Because most people are deeply troubled about the menace of drunk driv-
ing, legislation in this area could very well govern popular backing. Finally, legislative
oversight would create uniform standards, thereby minimizing the risk of constitutional
violations at the hands of overzealous safety officers.
185. Some argue that a judicial warrant should be secured prior to the operation of
a checkpoint. See Jacobs & Strossen, supra note 11, at 603.
186. Id.
187. The guidelines originate from the various elements the states require in sus-
taining roadblocks. See supra Part II of this Note at 154.
188. See supra notes 125 & 163 and accompanying text discussing procedural
means to alleviate intrusion upon the motorist.
189. See supra note 123 and accompanying text discussing requirement of supervi-
sory decision-making.
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the operation." ° The proposed model statute, adopting these consider-
ations, is as follows:
Authorization to Establish Impaired Driving Checkpoints
§ 101. Law enforcement officials are duly authorized to establish im-
paired driving checkpoints pursuant to the requirements in
§ 103. The Chief of Police or Board of Aldermen shall deter-
mine specific guidelines for all checkpoint programs pursuant to
the minimum guidelines in § 103. Nothing in § 103 shall pro-
hibit the establishment of procedures which are less intrusive
than those enumerated in § 103.
§ 102. Definitions
(1) "Impaired Driving Checkpoints" (IDCs) shall refer to any
roadblock procedure established by the Department or
Board of Aldermen for the purpose of checking motorists
for signs of intoxication while operating a motor vehicle.
(2) "Notice" shall consist of media publication via newspapers,
radio, and/or television broadcasts.
(3) "Fertile Field" shall designate a location which exhibits un-
usually high rates of alcohol-related accidents. "High"
shall be defined as any road and/or area where the rate of
alcohol-related accidents is double the rate of average DWI
arrests for the particular municipality. Statistics determin-
ing the "fertility" of a particular location shall be compiled
through past police records containing the location of ar-
rests of individuals for driving while intoxicated.
(4) "Articulable Suspicion" shall be determined by all factors
relevant to the search. Inspecting officers shall consider
factors including but not limited to: the motorists' personal
appearance, redness and/or swelling of the eyes, any odor
of alcohol, and any opened containers of alcoholic bever-
ages in plain view or observation. 91
§ 103. Minimum Standards for Roadblock Operations
(1) Notice of all roadblock programs shall be publicly dissemi-
nated 92 at least two weeks prior to actual operation. Pub-
190. See supra notes 51-56, 102-04 & 125 and accompanying text discussing appro-
priate safety mechanisms.
191. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text for discussion of neutral criteria.
192. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text discussing notice of roadblock
sites.
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lic announcements shall be made every hour if conducted
via the medium of television or radio. The location need
not be announced, but the date and hours of operation shall
be disclosed to the public.
(2) Location of the roadblock shall be determined in advance
by the Chief of Police or Board of Aldermen. The site cho-
sen shall reflect a "fertile field" for intoxicated drivers. 193
All sites chosen shall be supported by local studies and/or
testimony of the local police force.
(3) A systematic plan or pattern for stopping vehicles shall be
determined in advance by the Chief of Police. The plan
must provide for stopping all vehicles or every (nth)
vehicle. 194
(4) The following safety mechanisms1 95 shall be in operation at
all times during the course of the roadblock:
(a) A large illuminated sign to warn approaching motorists
of the checkpoint's existence and purpose.
(b) Uniformed police officers in marked police cars carry-
ing proper identification.
(c) Floodlights or flares to illuminate the checkpoint area.
(d) A designated holding area for those vehicles detained.
(5) Once an officer has articulable suspicion that a motorist is
intoxicated,196 the officer shall direct the motorist to the
designated holding area to perform a series of field sobriety
tests. 197
(6) Procedures shall be determined in advance to deal with
heavy traffic and congestion. Officers may wave vehicles
past the roadblock to avoid congestion, but shall do so at
regular time intervals.
(7) Motorists have the option of avoiding the roadblock and
turning around in their vehicle to pursue another route. If
a motorist pursues such a course of action, the police of-
193. See supra notes 107 & 137-39 discussing criteria considered in choosing road-
block site.
194. See supra notes 57-60 discussing Prouse dicta condoning a systematic plan.
195. See supra note 109 and accompanying text describing safety mechanisms
adopted by the Deskins court.
196. See supra note 8 discussing some observations which would give rise to reason-
able suspicion.
197. See supra note 9 discussing common sobriety tests.
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ficers may only stop the vehicle upon the basis of articulable
suspicion. ""
Adoption of a statute, modeled on the one proposed, would alleviate
many of the concerns the Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte 99 voiced regarding checkpoint searches conducted without
probable cause. Advance supervisory decision-making severely cir-
cumscribes official discretion. Furthermore, advance notice and ade-
quate safety mechanisms diminish the intrusion upon the motorist.
Finally, both the goals of apprehension and deterrence are adequately
served. Because the site chosen has a high rate of alcohol-related acci-
dents, it is more likely that drunk drivers will be apprehended. In or-
der to best serve the deterrence goal, however, the actual location of
the site, must not be publicized.
IV. CONCLUSION
No one disputes that states have a vital interest in keeping intoxi-
cated motorists off the road. Experience indicates that DWI road-
blocks can be employed effectively to combat the menace of drunk
drivers. Because the fourth amendment requires that all "seizures" be
reasonable, any sobriety checkpoint must have adequate safeguards.
Codifying rules and criteria for conducting roadblocks would provide
guidance to law enforcement officials in establishing DWI roadblocks,
while minimizing discretion of officials both in the field and at the ad-
ministrative decision-making level. Finally, a statutory solution would
free the judiciary from evaluating particular roadblocks once a court
establishes that the police conducted a stop in accordance with a con-
stitutionally valid statute.
Kelly M. Brown*
198. See supra notes 22, 33, 42-50, 62-67 and accompanying text discussing stan-
dards of articulable suspicion.
199. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text discussing the Martinez-Fuerte
case.
* J.D. 1991, Washington University.
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